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Non-technical Summary 
 
Corporate scientific publications are often presented as a strategic means for firms to create prior art 
with the objective to prevent rivals from patenting related inventions. This defensive disclosure 
strategy has attracted the attention of academic scholars in the field of law, economics and 
management science. The academic literature has developed different answers to the question why 
firms engage in defensive publishing at the costs of forgoing the right to exclude third parties from 
using the invention by applying for a patent. One stream of the literature, mainly put forward by 
economic scholars, analyzes defensive publishing in the context of patent race models. In these 
models, the laggard in the race has incentives to publish preliminary results that are not patentable in 
order to prolong the patent race. Scholars in law and management science consider open disclosure as 
a complementary strategy to patenting. The latter perspective finds partial confirmation in interviews 
with patent experts in the corporate sector, while the patent race model is largely rejected by 
practitioners. Both streams of the literature assume that corporate publications enter the pool of prior 
art which is relevant to judge the novelty of patent applications at the patent office and that they have 
the power to block or hinder patent applications. This proposed mechanism behind corporate 
publications as a means to preempt patents on related technologies so far lacked empirical evidence.  
This paper provides a first (large-scale) analysis of the effectiveness of corporate scientific 
publications regarding their power to block rivals’ patents. With focus on the semiconductor 
technology we show that scientific publications by corporations challenge the novelty and the 
inventive step of patent applications at the European Patent Office (EPO) significantly more than 
other pieces of prior art. Hence, we show that the mechanism behind the concept of defensive 
publishing works. Further, detailed information from the EPO patent examination procedure allows us 
to show that corporate publications threaten the novelty of patent applications in combination with 
other pieces of prior art, like patents, rather than as standalone documents. This supports the view of 
practitioners and scholars in law and management science who argue that corporate scientific 
publishing can be an effective means for firms to protect their freedom to operate if used a 
complementary part of a firms’ overall intellectual property protection strategy. 
 Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
 
Wenn Unternehmen technische Informationen außerhalb des Patentsystems publizieren und 
damit darauf abzielen, Patente für verwandte Technologien zu verhindern, wird das in der 
einschlägigen Literatur als “defensives Publizieren” bezeichnet. Die wissenschaftliche 
Literatur gibt verschiedene Antworten auf die Frage, warum sich Firmen entscheiden, 
Erfindungen zu publizieren statt diese zu patentieren und damit ein temporäres Monopolrecht 
auf die Erfindung erhalten. Eine Erklärung beruht auf der Analyse des defensiven 
Publizierens im Kontext von Patentrennen. In solchen Modellen, in denen typischerweise 
zwei Akteure darum wetteifern, eine Innovation als Erster zu vollenden, um sie dann zu 
patentieren, stellt defensives Publizieren eine attraktive Strategie für den im Rennen 
zurückliegenden dar. Wenn dieser seine vorläufigen Fortschritte publiziert, kann der 
vorneliegende Wettbewerber seine Erfindung nicht als Patent anmelden, da sie nicht mehr 
innovativ genug ist, und damit verlängert sich das Patentrennen. Eine alternative Erklärung 
sieht defensives Publizieren als komplementäre Strategie zum Patentieren. Diese Erklärung 
findet Bestätigung durch Patentexperten aus der Privatwirtschaft sowie durch Wissenschaftler 
der Rechtswissenschaften und der Betriebswirtschaftslehre. Beide Erklärungen für defensives 
Publizieren postulieren, dass Publikationen relevant genug sind, um bei der Beurteilung eine 
Rolle spielen, und dass sie zudem die Macht haben, Patentanmeldungen zu blockieren.  
Diese Studie unternimmt die erste empirische Analyse, um den postulierten Mechanismus zu 
untersucht. Am Beispiel von Patentanmeldungen in der Halbleiterindustrie zeigen wir, dass 
wissenschaftliche Publikationen von Unternehmen dazu in der Lage sind, Patentanmeldungen 
am Europäischen Patentamt (EPA) zu behindern. Anhand detaillierter Informationen des 
EPAs zeigen wir weiterhin, dass Publikationen aus der Privatwirtschaft insbesondere in 
Kombination mit anderen technischen Dokumenten, wie beispielsweise anderen Patenten, 
Patentanmeldungen blockieren. Dieses Ergebnis stützt die Hypothese, dass das Publizieren 
von Erfindungen als komplementäre Strategie zum Patentieren Teil einer effektiven Strategie 
zum Schutz geistigen Eigentums darstellen kann.  
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Abstract 
 
Corporate scientific publications are often presented as a strategic means 
for firms to create prior art with the objective to prevent others from 
patenting related inventions. This presumes that corporate publications 
enter the pool of prior art which is relevant to judge the novelty of patent 
applications at the patent office and that corporate science has the power to 
block patent applications. This paper analyses for the first time whether 
the presumed mechanism behind corporate publications as a means to pre-
empt patents works. With focus on the semiconductor technology our 
results show that scientific publications by corporations challenge the 
novelty of patent applications at the European Patent Office (EPO) 
significantly more than other pieces of prior art. Detailed information from 
the EPO patent examination procedure allows us to show that corporate 
publications threaten the novelty of patent applications if combined with 
other pieces of prior art like patents (rather than as standalone documents). 
This supports the view that corporate scientific publishing can be an 
effective means for firms to protect their freedom to operate if used as a 
complementary part of a firms’ overall IP protection strategy as proposed 
by scholars in the field of law and management science.  
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1. Introduction 
Innovation can be quintessential for achieving a competitive advantage vis-à-vis 
competitors and for long-term profitability. The extent to which firms profit from innovation 
hinges upon their ability to appropriate innovation rents (Cohen et al., 2000, Ceccagnoli, 
2009). Traditionally, the effectiveness of appropriation strategies has been evaluated with 
regard to their success in restraining third parties from using the invention, e.g. by gaining a 
temporary monopoly on using the invention via patent rights or by keeping the invention 
secret (Levin et al., 1987, Arundel et al., 1995, Cohen et al., 2000, Winter, 2006). A more 
general view establishes that effective appropriation mechanisms should guarantee the 
inventor the freedom to operate her technology in the first place (Henkel and Prangerl, 2008). 
The exclusion of third parties is only one way to achieve this. Alternatively, firms can submit 
technical information about an invention into the public domain to increase the pool of prior 
art and thereby increase the novelty threshold for related patent applications and, hence, 
preclude rivals from patenting, but not from using the published technology (Parchomocsky, 
2000, Johnson, 2004, Adams and Henson-Apollonio, 2002, Merges, 2004, Maurer, 2002, 
Borchardt, 2007, Buxbaum, 2001, Colson, 2001).1 This strategy is referred to as defensive or 
preemptive publishing. 
The academic literature has developed different answers to the question why firms engage 
in defensive publishing at the costs of forgoing the right to exclude third parties from using 
the invention. Economic scholars have analyzed defensive publishing in the context of patent 
race models (Parchomovsky, 2000, Baker and Mezzetti, 2005, Bar, 2006, Lichtmann et al., 
2000, De Fraja, 1993). Patent race models typically consider two inventors that compete for 
being first to complete and patent a specific invention. The time after which the invention 
occurs is ex-ante unknown and depends largely on the inventors’ investment in research and 
                                                 
1
 Merges (2004) and Maurer (2002) discuss defensive publishing in the context of genomics (see also 
Eisenberg, 2000). Examples of firms being highly active in publishing technical advances are IBM, 
Philips, Hitachi, ICI, Ciba, Siemens, Sandoz, Roche, Hoechst and Toshiba (Hicks, 1995). In the 
technology field of computer science, IBM and AT&T each published more than Stanford and MIT 
together in the period 1991-2001. In material sciences, IBM is ranked number two after Tohoku 
University (Science Watch, 2001). 
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development. In these models, the loser typically receives no or little return to her investment, 
while the winner gets all (e.g. Reinganum, 1982). Defensive publishing is introduced into 
these models by allowing for the option to disclose knowledge outside the patent system. In 
such a scenario, the laggard has incentives to disclose her findings before the leader applies 
for a patent in order to expand the state of the art and, therewith, increase the patentability 
requirements for the rival and prolong the patent race.  
The patent race explanation for defensive publishing has raised criticisms on both legal 
and strategic grounds (Eisenberg, 2000). With regard to the U.S. patent legislation, Eisenberg 
(2000) argues that the first-to-invent rule2 and the statutory bars of the U.S. patent doctrine3, 
which define prior art as of one year prior to the application date, limit the effectiveness of 
preemptive publications. From a strategic point of view, Eisenberg (2000) criticizes that the 
disclosure of relevant information outside the patent system might not be beneficial for the 
laggard since it can speed up the completion of the rival’s invention by means of knowledge 
spillovers (De Fraja, 1993) and invite additional competitors, while at the same time, it 
increases the patenting threshold for the laggard firm as well (Rinner, 2003). 
Scholars in the fields of law and management science suggest defensive publishing as a 
complementary strategy to patenting (Colson, 2001, Buxbaum, 2001, Rinner, 2003, Johnson, 
2004, Henkel and Pangerls, 2008). In this setting, companies ponder the costs and benefits of 
patent protection for their inventions. Johnson (2004) develops a theoretical framework in 
which companies can choose between patenting, publishing and keeping the invention secret 
depending on the respective costs and benefits. A major difference between this model and 
the patent race models is that the latter models consider defensive publishing as a strategy for 
the laggard who is unable to patent, while Johnson (2004) models defensive publishing as an 
equivalent alternative to patenting and secrecy.  His model predicts that publishing is most 
attractive for inventions that are less technically challenging or that can be easily invented 
                                                 
2
 The first-to-invent rule allows the patent applicant to prove the invention was completed earlier than 
the conflicting prior art (U.S. patent doctrine, section 102(a)). This practice is referred as “swearing 
behind the reference” or “Rule 131 affidavit” (Eisenberg, 2000: 2360) 
3
 See U.S. patent doctrine, section 102(b). 
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around. Publishing can be a defense against “patent pirates” that strive for patent rights with 
the aim to exploit these patents in litigations. These predictions received partial support from 
law scholars and intellectual property (IP) experts who strongly advise to rely on defensive 
publishing only for minor improvements on existing core technologies which are already well 
protected (Buxbaum, 2001, Colson, 2001, Rinner, 2003). Henkel and Pangerls (2008) confirm 
the use of defensive publishing as a complementary strategy to patenting based on interviews 
with 44 patent experts from 37 publicly listed companies in the German business sector. They 
strongly dismiss the patent race model: companies would barely know if they are in a race and 
they would, in particular, not be able to determine their position in the race (whether they are 
the laggard or the leader).    
Previous literature leaves two questions unanswered: First, it is unclear whether the 
proposed mechanism of corporate publications as a means to preempt patents on related 
technologies works. In other words, do corporate publications enter the pool of prior art that is 
used by the patent office to evaluate new patent applications; and if so, can they block the 
grant of patent applications? Second, the question arises whether corporate publications can 
hinder patent grant decisions as standalone documents - as proposed by the patent race models 
- or whether they have to be combined with other IP strategies like patenting, for instance, in 
order to be effective - as proposed by the management science and law literature. 
We provide an empirical analysis for these research questions based on a sample of patent 
applications at the European Patent Office (EPO). We answer the first research question by 
investigating the impact of corporate scientific publications4 cited in patent applications on 
the patent examination outcome. We employ detailed information about the reason for which 
the specific references are relevant for the patent application, which is available from the EPO 
(Webb et al., 2005, Harhoff et al., 2005). This allows us to distinguish prior art cited as non-
                                                 
4
 We focus on scientific corporate publications only because we want to ensure that the corporate 
disclosure has technical significance as evaluated by the peers. Other forms of disclosure like corporate 
postings on disclosure platforms or presentations at trade fairs might be vague regarding its technical 
specificities. Corporate scientific publications have been identified as the second most effective means 
for defensive publishing (Henkel and Pangerl, 2008).   
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infringing state of the art from documents that threaten the novelty of the patent application in 
question. Focusing on the novelty threatening references to corporate science allows us to 
determine the blocking power of corporate publications in the patent system as opposed to 
other pieces of prior art, like patents and publications taken out by the public sector. The 
second question can be answered by distinguishing between references in patent applications 
that are novelty threatening if taken alone and such that are blocking if combined with other 
pieces of prior art, like for instance with a patent. The managerial view on the effect of 
corporate science in the patent system would be supported if we would find that corporate 
science is not blocking itself but only in combination with other pieces of prior art. This 
would imply that firms cannot rely on publications to protect their IP but should use 
complementary IP protection mechanisms like patents.  
Besides the access to detailed information about the patent examination procedure at the 
EPO, focusing on the European patent system has the advantage that Eisenberg’s (2000) 
critique against the effectiveness of corporate science as an IP protection strategy based on 
legal grounds does not apply. For one, the EPO has a first-to-file rule in place rather than a 
first-to-invent regulation, and second, the EPO defines prior art as all inventions being known 
before the first date of filing. This renders defensive publishing a potentially more effective 
strategy in the European context than in the U.S.  
Our analysis focuses on the semiconductor technology in the period 1995-2000. At least 
two characteristics render this technology attractive for our analysis. First, it is characterized 
by a strong reliance upon scientific discoveries (Breschi and Catalini, 2010). Second, the 
semiconductor technology is a complex technology where a single product relies on several 
patents. Firms in complex technologies own fragmented patent portfolios and pursue 
“portfolio maximizing” IP protection strategies in order to avoid being held up by other firms 
(Hall and Ziedonis, 2001, Ziedonis, 2004). Semiconductor firms, accordingly, engage in 
patent portfolio races rather than in traditional patent races (Hall and Ziedonis, 2004). In this 
context, the dissemination of scientific results by firms can represent an effective 
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complementary means (e.g. to patenting) for securing their freedom to operate technologies as 
suggested by the management science and law literature.  
This study makes two contributions to the literature on corporate disclosure. First, we 
provide the first systematic large-scale analysis of the effectiveness of corporate scientific 
publications in the patent system. We show that corporate publications can help secure the 
freedom to operate a technology by blocking the granting of related patent applications as 
pieces of prior art. This shows that the mechanism imposed by both economics as well as 
scholars in management science and law, i.e. that corporate science enters the pool of prior art 
and by doing so increases patenting thresholds, works. Prior empirical evidence on the 
effectiveness of defensive publishing is limited to case illustrations within the field of 
genomics (Eisenberg, 2000, Maurer, 2002, Merges, 2004) and interviews with IP experts in 
the private sector (Henkel and Pangerl, 2008). Second, we show that corporate publications 
are especially effective against patent grant decisions in combination with other pieces of 
prior art rather than as standalone documents. In line with the law and management science 
literature, this suggests that corporate publications when used for defensive publishing 
purpose are most effective as a complementary part of a firm’s overall IP protection strategy. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the patentability 
criteria at the EPO and details how scientific publications can impact patent grant decisions. 
Section 3 describes the construction of the data set and presents descriptive statistics. The 
fourth section shows the empirical results. Section 5 provides additional tests to strengthen 
our interpretation of the main findings. The last section concludes. 
2. The European Patent System 
This section outlines the patentability requirements at the EPO and details how scientific 
publications can impact patent grant decisions.       
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2.1 Patentability Requirements 
According to article 52(1) of the European Patent Convention (EPC), a patent application 
has to fulfill three criteria to be granted: a) novelty, b) inventive step and c) industrial 
applicability. Scientific publications can play a significant role when a patent application’s 
novelty and its inventive step are evaluated. Article 54(1) of the EPC defines novelty as not 
being part of the state of the art. The state of the art is defined as “everything made available 
to the public by means of a written or oral description, by use, or in any other way, before the 
date of filing of the European patent application.” (EPC, article 54(2)). The inventive step 
demands that the invention “having regards to the state of the art, [it] is not obvious to a 
person skilled in the art” (EPC, article 56). 
Scientific publications (as well as other pieces of patent and non-patent technical 
disclosure) can expand the state of the art in technology fields. If scientific publications 
contain new and relevant technical knowledge they can push forward the novelty frontier. 
Consequently, they can affect the requirements for the inventive step as defined by the current 
state of the art (Barrett, 2002, Bar-Gill and Parchomovsky, 2003, Henkel and Pangerls, 2008, 
Parchomovsky, 2000). 
2.2. Searches for Prior Art 
Once a patent application is filed, the search divisions of the EPO carry out a patentability 
search. The aim of such searches is to collect technical information which defines the state of 
the art relevant to judge the appropriateness of the scope of the legal protection as requested 
in the application document.5 Examiners base their searches on the exact wording of the 
claims. The result of their search is documented in the so-called search report which lists all 
references to previous technical documentations in order to determine the novelty and the 
                                                 
5
 At the United States Patents and Trademarks Office (USPTO), in contrast, patent applicants are 
subject to the “duty of candor”. This means that they have to submit a list of all relevant prior art along 
with the patent application. Non-compliance can result in a rejection of the patent application. Given 
that the duty of compliance the applicants, patent applicants at USPTO provide a disproportionate high 
number of references (Silverman, 2003).     
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inventive step of the patent application at the time of the filing.6 The search of relevant prior 
art follows the Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office7 in order to 
guarantee a certain quality standard as wells as equal treatment of all EPO patent applications. 
For this study, at least two features of the EPO search report deserve attention. Firstly, the 
examination guidelines explicitly require examiners to be objective and selective when 
defining the documents referred to as prior art. In most of the cases one to two documents are 
sufficient to determine the scope of the patent application in question (Michel and Bettels, 
2001). This parsimonious and objective approach ensures that the references are a relevant 
subsample of the actual state of the art rather than an overview on the subject-matter of the 
invention (Harhoff and Reitzig, 2004, Harhoff et al., 2005).  
A second feature of the EPO search reports is the classification of references according to 
their relevance in terms of the three criteria of patentability (Dernis et al., 2005, Webb et al., 
2005, Harhoff et al., 2005). Two types of citations challenge the patentability of patent 
applications (citation types X and Y). X-type citations are documents showing essential 
features of the invention under investigation or at least questioning the novelty and the 
inventive step of these features if taken alone. Y-type citations question the inventive step 
claimed in the invention being examined, when combined with other pieces of prior art. The  
Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office give two examples for the 
occurrence of Y-type citations. First, the combination of patents and scientific documents 
receives Y-type citations if it challenges the novelty of the patent application in question. And 
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 The evaluation of the third criterion of industrial applicability usually does not imply further 
assessment based on prior art (Michel and Bettels, 2001). 
7
 See http://www.epo.org/patents/law/legal-texts/guidelines.html. 
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second, novelty threatening patent families are cited as Y-type references (see Chapter X, 
paragraph 9.1.2). The first example describes the relevant case for our analysis.8   
The minimalistic approach to prior art searches and the categorization of the references 
according to the patentability criteria enable us to assess the impact of scientific contributions 
in the process of patent granting. The principle of parsimony regarding the references allows 
us to identify the scientific “shoulders” on which new technical improvements stand. The 
categorization of references tells us to which extent the novelty and incentive step of patent 
applications is threatened by prior art and by corporate science, in particular.  
3. Data Collection and Descriptive Statistics 
3.1 Patent Data Sources 
We analyze a cross-sectional database of EPO patent applications in the field of 
semiconductor from 1995-2000 that were granted or rejected by 2009. Our primary source of 
information is the EPO database, which includes information about all patent applications 
since its foundation in 1977. From this database we retrieve all patent applications assigned to 
the semiconductor technology in the years 1995-2000.9 We define the technology field of 
semiconductor according to the Observatoire des Sciences et des Techniques (OST-
INPI/FhG-ISI), also known as the Fraunhofer technology classification (Schmoch, 2008). 
This categorization aggregates the narrowly defined patent technology classes of the 
International Patent Classification (IPCs) to technology fields. Semiconductor applications are 
identified by the 4-digit IPC code “H01L”. We identified 8,385 different semiconductor 
patent applications in our time period of interest. For these patents we retrieved the 
                                                 
8
 Guellec et al. (2009) show that X- and Y-type references to the patent literature significantly hinder 
positive patent grant decisions. For this reason, we also use the term “blocking citations” or “blocking 
references” in the following. X- and Y-type references have, further, been used in the prior empirical 
literature to identify weak patents when predicting the likelihood of patent opposition (Harhoff and 
Reitzig, 2004, Reitzig, 2004, Czarnitzki et al., 2009). Also, patents receiving X and Y citations by 
future patent applications have been shown to increase firms’ market value (Czarnitzki et al., 2010) as 
well as firms’ value in the market for corporate control (Grimpe and Hussinger, 2008a,b).  
9
 Later patent applications are not considered because we are interested in the outcome of the patent 
application decision which can take place several years after the application date. Earlier patents could 
not be considered as we have only limited information on (cited) scientific publications issued before 
1988. 
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application year, IPC classes, inventor and applicant information as well as the patent 
decision outcome as of 2009 (granted, rejected, pending, withdrawn).  
Information about the references made by our patents were gathered from the 
“EPO/OECD patent citation database”. This database covers all types of references to prior 
art including references to patents and references to the non-patent literature (NPL) (Webb et 
al., 2005). The 8,385 semiconductor patent applications cite 37,307 other patents and make 
9,925 references to the non-patent literature. We also extracted the classification of references 
from the search reports from this data source to be able to distinguish between blocking 
references (X- and Y-type of references) and such that describe the non-infringing state of the 
art in a particular field of semiconductor technology.10 Furthermore, we extracted information 
on patent priority claims from these files. A patent application may claim priority from a 
previously filed application at a different patent office in order to take advantage of the filing 
date of that earlier application. The pool of prior art is then restricted to documents that were 
published before that first filing date. 
3.2 Construction of the Sample 
While references to patent documents can be easily handled since they are identified by 
their patent application number this is not the case for the cited non-patent literature. NPLs 
are documented in form of text fields including the article title, author information, journal 
name and publication year. The format of these text fields differs across the records. This is 
partly explained by the fact that the NPL records are quite heterogeneous encompassing a 
range of documents such as scientific articles, books, abstract meetings and abstract services 
but also trade journals and presentations at trade fairs. Accordingly, not all NPLs represent a 
link to scientific work (Harhoff et al., 2003a). Across all technology fields, roughly about 
65% of the NPL references are of scientific nature (Callaert et al., 2006). For our sample, we 
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 Unfortunately, the data that is available to us does not allow to identify which of the cited documents 
belong together as novelty threatening if combined (Y-type of references). For researchers outside of 
the EPO, references to patent and the non-patent literature are available in different spreadsheets. These 
can be linked via the patent application numbers to the patent documents, but the link between different 
pieces of prior art that are blocking together is lost. 
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manually coded the NPL records in order to retrieve journal and author names. The result of 
this exercise was a list of all references to the patent and non-patent literature that are cited in 
our semiconductor patents.  
In the next step, we linked the list of NPL references to the SCI-Expanded (Science 
Citation Index Expanded) file of the Web of Science publication database in order to identify 
NPLs that correspond to scientific journal publications. The SCI-Expanded database provides 
access to articles published in the most important 8,130 journals across different disciplines. 
In total, 80% of all scientific journals are covered by this database (Van Vianen et al., 1990). 
NPLs were matched with the publication file based on author names, journal names and 
publication years. A computer-supported search algorithm was used to facilitate the link. Each 
potential match proposed by the algorithm was checked manually. The link allows us to 
distinguish references to scientific journals from other NPLs. We recovered 2,124 scientific 
contributions being cited in 893 patent applications in our sample.11 Furthermore, we 
extracted the author affiliations from the publication files in order to be able to distinguish 
corporate publications from scientific advances published by the public sector.12 The top 
publishing companies in our sample with more than 20 articles cited in the patent literature 
are AT&T, IBM, NTT, Hitachi, NEC, Phillips, Siemens/Infineon, Motorola, Matsushita, 
Toshiba, Texas Instruments and Fujitsu.  
The final sample is subject to some restrictions: First, we only kept granted and rejected 
patent applications. Pending patent applications were excluded since we have to observe the 
final decision on a patent application to be able to evaluate the impact of corporate scientific 
publications on the patent examination outcome. Withdrawn patent applications were 
excluded as well since withdrawals present a patent application outcome which is outside the 
control of the patent office. In total, 1,812 pending or withdrawn patent applications were 
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 The majority of NPLs that did not represent links to scientific journals are references to specialized 
disclosure platforms, like IP.com, and company bulletins, like the IBM bulletin. 
12
 We use that term “public sector” in the broadest sense in this papers. Publications from the public 
sector include all non-corporate publications such as scientific publications taken out by universities, 
public research institutions, governmental institutions, private persons etc. 
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dropped. Second, we restrict our analysis to corporate patent applications as there is some 
evidence that patent applications from scientific institutions or academic inventors are 
significantly different regarding the nature of the protected invention (Trajtenberg et al., 1997, 
Czarnitzki et al., 2009). In this step, 347 patent applications without any firm participation 
were excluded. In total, our final sample consists of 6,226 rejected or granted corporate patent 
applications in the field of semiconductor technology. Table 7 in the Appendix shows the 
distribution of our patent applications across different disciplines within semiconductor 
technology. 
We created a unique identifier for patent applicants in our sample to account for 
unobserved effects on the level of the patent applicant in the empirical analysis. As before, a 
text-based search algorithm was used. Each potential “group” of patent applicants referring to 
the same corporation proposed by the algorithm was manually checked.13 The top patenting 
firms in our sample are Infineon/Siemens, STMicroelectronics, NEC, Applied Materials Inc., 
Sumitomo, Texas Instruments, Philips, Canon, Matsushita, and IBM with more than 100 
granted or rejected patent applications. 
A limitation of the data gathering process was that the SCI-Expanded database is only 
available to us from 1988 onwards. Hence, we could not classify NPLs that were published 
earlier as being scientific or not. Further, we were not able to identify some references in the 
SCI-Expanded database due to incomplete or ambiguous information in the patent reference 
list. We account for both in the empirical analysis by including a first dummy variable 
indicating that a patent application cites NPLs published before 1988 and a second dummy 
variable indicating citations to NPLs with unidentified nature in our regression model. In 
total, there are only 4% of the all NPLs for which we could not retrieve all necessary 
information.  
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 Multiple patent applicants on patent applications were treated as research consortia and, hence, 
received their own id as a group. The reason is that these such patents might be taken out by temporary 
joint ventures between firms or that they might be the outcome of a specific collaborative project 
between multiple firms. Such collaborative efforts can deviate from the firms’ core research in 
semiconductor and are likely to have their own budgets. For this reason, we prefer to treat research 
consortia as separate entities. 
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3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the later multivariate 
regression models for the patent application outcome.14 The descriptive statistics show that 
granted patent applications differ from rejected ones in several ways. Granted patents, for 
instance, make more references to prior art (REF). The number of backward citations has 
been given different interpretations in the previous literature. Some scholars argue that patents 
with many backward citations are of a more incremental nature and that they target more 
crowded technology fields in the U.S. context (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001). Others 
claim that patents with many backward citations protect an invention with a large scope that 
invites the patent examiner at the EPO to delineate the patent claims by inserting more 
references to relevant prior art (Harhoff et al., 2003a). As a measure for the scope of patents 
backwards citations are an important variable in our empirical analysis since novelty 
challenging (X- and Y-type) citations are given by the examiner to limit the scope of patent 
applications. In the empirical specification, we use the logarithm of the total references to 
account for the skewness of this variable’s distribution. As a second measure for the scope of 
a patent application the number of 4-digit IPC classes is used (Lerner, 1994).15 Due to the 
skewness of the this variable’s distribution the logarithm is used. If this variable is larger than 
zero the patent application is attributed to other technology fields than semiconductor. The 
correlation between both patent scope proxies is low with 20% (see Table 8 in the Appendix). 
Focusing on the novelty challenging references to prior art, Table 1 shows, that, not 
surprisingly, granted patent applications receive fewer blocking references (XY REF) than 
rejected ones. Note that a patent application can still be granted if it receives many references 
classified as X or Y.  This can be the case for patent applications with many claims or with a 
broad scope. X- and Y-type references may pertain to single claims and the remaining claims 
can be strong enough to get a (modified) application granted. Since the number of total 
references as a proxy for the scope of the patent application and the number of blocking 
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 Table 8 in the Appendix shows bivariate correlation for our main regressors. 
15
 The number of claims is unfortunately not available to us. 
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references are correlated by definition, we normalize the number of blocking references by 
the number of total references (XY REF/REF) for the specification of the empirical model.  
Considering the total number of references to the non-patent literature (NPL), Table 1 
shows that rejected patent applications make significantly more references to the non-patent 
literature. Rejected patent applications make significantly more reference to the scientific 
literature (JOUR) as a subgroup of citations to the non-patent literature as well. The average 
patent application in semiconductor cites .26 scientific sources. This underlines the science-
basedness of semiconductor technologies. The fact that the number of scientific NPLs is 
higher among rejected patent applications than among granted ones suggests that, in the field 
of semiconductor, science does not only represent prior art that lays a foundation for 
technology development, but that scientific publications also challenge the novelty of  patent 
applications. 
The variable XY JOUR REF/XY REF presents the average share of scientific references 
among the blocking type of references the patent applications receive. An average of 5% of 
the blocking references per patent application stem from scientific publications. Again, the 
share is significantly higher among rejected patent applications. Distinguishing between X- 
and Y-type of references among journal references shows that 3% of the blocking type 
references per patent application refer to scientific publications that are blocking as 
standalone documents (X JOUR REF/XY REF) while another 2% refer to Y-type citations to 
science that is blocking in combination with other pieces of prior art (Y JOUR REF/XY REF). 
Regarding the origin of the novelty threatening scientific publications, an average of 4% of 
the blocking references to science per patent refers to corporate publications (XY comp JOUR 
REF/XY JOUR REF). On average, 4% of these refer to X-type citations to corporate scientific 
publications (X comp JOUR REF/XY JOUR REF) and 2% refer to Y-type references to 
science taken out by the private sector (Y comp REF/XY JOUR REF). 
In addition to our main variables of interest and the control variables for patent scope, we 
have a number of additional control variables. We control for the time that passed between the 
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patent application at EPO and the final grant decision. More complex technologies 
presumably need more time to be evaluated (Sampat et al., 2003). The logarithm of this 
variable as measured in years (plus one) is used to account for the skewness of its distribution. 
Further, the (log of the) number of inventors is used as a proxy for the size of the innovation 
project. The major share of investments into innovation projects typically represents the 
wages of the R&D personnel. The number of inventors can, hence, be seen as a proxy for the 
investment made for a patent application.  
Further, we control for the priority of the patent applications in our sample. A patent 
examiner might use the priority application of the EPO patent application as a reference when 
searching for prior art. We use four dummies to control for priority at different patent offices, 
namely the USPTO (2,220 patent applications), the Japanese Patent Office (2,271), the EPO 
(473) and national European patent offices (1,561). Patents with priority at other patent 
offices worldwide are used as the benchmark (257).16  
Moreover, a dummy variable is used to indicate if a patent application has co-applicants 
from the public sector (PUBLIC). In total, 91 granted and rejected patent applications in our 
sample are applied for by private-public research co-operations. A set of application year 
dummies is used to control for time trends because patent pendencies at the EPO increased 
sharply since the later 1980s (Harhoff and Wagner, 2009). In order to control for technology 
subclasses within semiconductor eight subfield dummies are used (see Table 7 in the 
Appendix for the definition of these dummy variables). 
Lastly, we use two dummy variables to account for weaknesses of our database. First, a 
dummy variable controls for patent applications with NPLs published before 1988 as we 
could not retrieve information about the authors and author affiliation of these publications 
from the Web of Science. A second dummy variable indicates references to NPLs that could 
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 We do not include applicant countries in our empirical specification since they are highly correlated 
with the priority dummies. Most applicants get priority at the patent office of the country in which they 
are located. 
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not be classified as being scientific or not due to incomplete or ambiguous information on 
their citations records. In total, for 8% of the patents we have incomplete information.  
Table 1 about here 
4. Empirical Results 
In this section, we estimate probit models to analyze the effect of scientific publications on 
the patent grant decision. We model the patent grant decision di as a function of the different 
types of prior art cited in the search report for the focal patent application i. di takes the value 
one if patent application i gets granted and zero if the examination at EPO leads to a rejection. 
Due to the high correlation of the different types of references to prior art (i.e. an average 
patent application with many references typically has also many references in the particular 
categories that we want to distinguish) we use a cascade specification (Hall et al., 2005), i.e. 
we orthogonalize each patent reference variable by the next more general group of references: 
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The interpretation of the coefficients of this specification is that each ratio presents a 
premium (or a discount) on the former one (Hall et al., 2005). For instance, if the total number 
of references (REF) would have a positive impact on the patent grant decision and the share 
of novelty challenging cites among them (XY REF/REF) would have a negative impact, the 
estimated coefficient for the latter variable would reflect a discount on the positive effect of 
the total number of references. This logic applies to all variables in the cascade. The share of 
scientific publications among the references with a blocking potential is depicted by XY 
JOUR REF/XY REF and indicates whether scientific prior art among the blocking references 
is more (or less) relevant for the patent grant decision than the average novelty challenging. 
The last variable of central interest (XY comp JOUR REF/ XY JOUR REF) presents the share 
of company publications among the challenging scientific references. This variable shows 
whether corporate science is more (or less) challenging for the novelty of patent applications 
than the average blocking reference to science. A positive estimated coefficient would show 
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that corporate scientific publications are more effective when challenging patent applications 
than the average XY scientific reference. This answers the research question whether 
corporate publications are an effective means to preempt patent applications by expanding the 
patentability threshold.  Finally, Xi presents the vector of control variables as described in the 
previous section.  
The standard probit model relies on the assumption of homoscedasticity of the error term 
ui. We estimate heteroscedastic probit models since a violation of the homoscedasticity 
assumption leads not only to biased standard errors, but also to inconsistent coefficient 
estimates (see Greene, 2000). We replace the homoscedastic variance σ  by 
σi = exp(ωi’α), where ωi represents the regressors determining the variance function and α the 
additional coefficients to be estimated.17 ωi includes five application year dummies, eight 
technology field dummies and the (log of) the time until a decision about a patent application 
is reached. We tested for the presence of heteroscedasticity in our probit models by means of 
LM tests (see Greene, 2000). The test statistics presented at the bottom of Table 2 show that 
homoscedasticity is rejected in all cases. Hence, the coefficients of standard probit models 
would be misleading. In addition, we use clustered standard errors on the level of the 
applicant to account for the fact that the error terms of the empirical model might be 
correlated for patent applications by the same applicant.  
The estimation results summarized in Table 2 show several interesting findings. 
Concerning the baseline specification (model 1), which includes only the control variables, 
we find, for instance, that patents citing more prior art are more likely to become granted. 
This result does not support the interpretation that patents with many backward citations are 
of more incremental nature (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001). It is rather in line with 
previous research arguing that backward citations reflect the scope of the patented technology 
(Harhoff et al., 2003a). The finding that patents with references to patents assigned to many 
different technology classes is more likely to become granted points in the same direction. 
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 Note that robust standard errors do not help if heteroscedasticity is found  in nonlinear models. 
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Patents associated with many different technologies presumably have a greater patent scope, 
which has been shown to correlate with the importance of patents (Lerner, 1994) and renders 
a positive granting decision more likely.  
The next control variable captures the effect of time since application. The longer the 
patent examination takes the more likely is a grant. This suggests that patent applications 
which require a longer examination time are more complex (Sampat et al., 2003) and 
potentially more novel. The number of inventors as a proxy for the size of the innovation 
project has a positive, but weakly significant effect. There is no difference between purely 
private patents and patents taken out in alliance with the public sector regarding the likelihood 
of a positive grant decision. Lastly, application year dummies, priority dummies and 
technology class dummies are jointly significant as LR-tests at the bottom of Table 2 show. In 
particular, the priority dummies are highly significant, which is mainly driven by the fact that 
patents with a U.S. priority are significantly less likely to become granted at the EPO. The 
estimated effects of the control variables are robust across the different specifications 
presented in Table 2. 
In model 2, we add the share of all references (patents and scientific and non-scientific 
NPLs) which are classified as prior art that threatens the novelty of patent applications (XY 
REF/REF) as an additional regressor to our specification. These references are made to limit 
the scope of patent applications by evaluating their novelty with regard to prior inventions. As 
expected, the estimated coefficient clearly indicates that these references that patent examiner 
includes to delineate the patent claims make a positive grant decision less likely (Guellec et 
al., 2009). The marginal effect equals -0.14 at the means of all other variables indicating that 
the likelihood of a positive grant decision decreases by 14% in response to a unit change of 
the share of blocking references, i.e. if a patent application without any blocking reference 
would suddenly have only blocking references. The fact that additional blocking references 
do not inhibit the grant decision shows that patent applications that receive many blocking 
references can well be granted if claims are removed or modified and the scope of the patent 
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application is narrowed. Documents cited as blocking can, hence, cause that patent protection 
is not granted for important claims.18 
Model 3 adds the share of scientific publications that are classified as novelty threatening 
(XY JOUR REF/XY REF) to the specification. The results show that novelty threatening 
journal publications increase the probability of getting a patent application rejected 
significantly. Accordingly, in the field of semiconductor, scientific NPLs do not only reflect 
scientific results that lead to technology development. In this science-based technology field, 
scientific publications have the power to threaten the novelty of patent applications beyond 
the power of an average blocking reference. The regression results suggest that scientific 
articles even have an extra blocking effect on top of the average blocking citation which is 
captured by the variable (XY REF/REF). The marginal effect equals -0.17 at the means of all 
other variables indicating that the likelihood of a positive grant decision decreases by 17% in 
response to a unit change of the share of scientific blocking references among all blocking 
references, i.e. if a patent application without any scientific blocking reference would 
suddenly have only scientific blocking references.  
Model 4 investigates whether corporate scientific publications (XY comp JOUR REF/ XY 
JOUR REF) are responsible for this extra blocking effect of scientific NPLs. The results show 
that the extra blocking effect of science in the patent system stems from company 
publications. If company publications are taken into account separately on top of the overall 
effect of blocking scientific NPLs the latter variable becomes insignificant. This suggests that 
only corporate publications have a blocking effect on patent applications on top of the overall 
blocking effect of X- and Y-type citations. Scientific publications taken out by the public 
sector are to the same extent blocking as the average piece of prior art classified as X or Y. 
This result confirms the mechanism assumed by scholars in economics, law and management 
science that corporate science has the power to challenge patent applications. The finding of 
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 Unfortunately, we do not information on the changes that are made to the patent application 
throughout the examination procedure so that we cannot analyze whether claims had to be removed. 
Claims are not available in the EPO patent database.   
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superior blocking power of corporate science is, further,  in line with the presumption that 
there is a strategic consideration behind company publications. The marginal effect of the 
blocking company citations equals -0.11 at the means of all other variables suggesting that the 
likelihood of a positive grant decision decreases by 11% in response to a unit change of the 
share of company references among all blocking scientific references, i.e. if a patent 
application without any scientific blocking reference to company publications would suddenly 
have only scientific blocking references to the private sector. The marginal effect might seem 
small. But one has to keep in mind that this is the effect that realizes in addition to the effect 
of the other blocking references.  
Model 5 distinguishes between X- and Y-type citations to corporate publications and to 
scientific references in general. The distinction allows us to test whether corporate 
publications are effective for patent blocking purpose if taken alone (X-type) or whether they 
would need to be combined with another piece of prior art like a patent (Y-type) as proposed 
by the law and management science literature. A very interesting result appears. Only the 
share of Y-type citations to the private sector has an additional blocking effect (on top of the 
average cited blocking document). This suggests that corporate publications are only effective 
if combined with other pieces of prior art and not as standalone documents (X-type citation). 
The marginal effect equals -0.16 at the means of all other variables suggesting that the 
likelihood of a positive grant decision decreases by 16% in response to a unit change of the 
share of Y-type company references among all blocking scientific references.19 The finding 
that company publications have a blocking power if combined with other pieces of prior art 
(and not as standalone documents) is in line with the predictions from the law and 
management science literature that publishing can be a successful IP protection strategy if it is 
combined with stronger IP protection means, like patents. 
Table 2 about here 
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 The estimated marginal effects for the other significant regressors did not decrease significantly in 
size if more variables are added. Hence, they are not reported again. 
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One could hypothesize that the patent portfolios of the largest patent applicants are better 
known to the patent examiners since they have to evaluate many patents from these 
submitters. This might impact the examination procedure of these applicants’ patents. Table 9 
in the Appendix shows that our results are robust if we delete the most active patent 
applicants with more than 200 patent applications each. Hence, we are confident that our 
results are not driven by potentially different examination procedures at the EPO for the 
submissions by the largest patent applicants. We further checked whether the journal 
publications that are cited as blocking prior art are citations to the companies’ own scientific 
publications. If the fraction of the blocking citations to science taken out by the same 
applicant is added as a separate variable to model 4 the estimated effects do not change 
significantly and the effect of journal self-citations is not statistically significant. 
5. Are Corporate Publications More Applied? 
The results presented in the previous section have shown that corporate science has a 
superior power to block patent grant decisions at the EPO than the average reference marked 
as blocking by the patent examiner; this effect does not hold for science produced in the 
public sector though. This can be the outcome of strategic disclosure by companies to secure 
the freedom to operate a technology by blocking patent applications for related technologies. 
An alternative explanation could be that corporate publications address more applied 
technologies than scientific publications from the public sector so that they are more relevant 
for the evaluation of the novelty of patent applications. This section undertakes a comparison 
between scientific publication from the corporate and public sector in order to rule out that 
our finding of superior blocking power of corporate publications is explained by their more 
applied character.  
The differences between science produced in the private and public sector are largely 
documented (e.g. Dasgupta and David, 1994, Stokes, 1997, Fleming and Sorensen, 2004). 
Shortly, the curiosity-driven public scientist strives for intellectual challenges, which might 
not be of any industrial interest. Science has priority over commercialization and the 
21 
 
incentives for innovators are significantly determined by peer recognition and career awards 
such as tenure rather than by monetary rewards (Merton, 1973). The corporate scientist, in 
contrast, is hired for the explicit purpose of generating knowledge with a commercialization 
potential for the firm (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). These different conditions and 
motivations for corporate and public science cause that science in the private sector is 
typically more applied than research conducted in the public sector (Dasgupta and David, 
1994, Trajtenberg et al., 1997, Czarnitzki et al., 2009). If the difference in the nature of 
incentives and goals in both sectors was reflected in scientific publications (cited by our 
semiconductor patents), the more applied character of the corporate publications could 
explain the superior blocking power in the patent system. In this section, we therefore 
investigate whether there is evidence for corporate publications being more applied than 
science published by the public sector. Several tests are presented.  
As a first check we compare the scientific journals in which the corporate and public 
articles that are cited in our patents are published. If corporate science was more applied, we 
would expect that companies publish in more applied journals. Table 3 presents a list of the 
journals in which the majority of our articles cited in patents are published. It appears that all 
of the journals that are cited in patents are applied. There are no systematic differences 
regarding the distribution of corporate and public sector publications across journals. A 
Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon rank-sum test on the rankings of publication frequency across 
journals are equal at their medians (p-value = 0.66).20  
Table 3 about here    
Previous literature has established that university patents take longer to get granted and are 
cited later as compared to corporate patents (Sampat et al., 2003). It is argued that this is 
because university patents cover more basic technologies and are, hence, more difficult to be 
evaluated by the patent office and adapted by other inventors. Following this logic, we can 
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 We also ran two-paired t-tests that confirmed the previous finding. For a matter of robustness, we ran 
the same test for the distribution of shares in the first 20, 30 and 50 journals in the total sample. The 
results indicate no differences in the distributions (p-value = 0.94 for the first 20 journals; p-value = 
0.71 for the first 30 journals; and p-value = 0.43 for the first 50 journals). 
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extend the same rationale for scientific publications and propose that publications from the 
public sector should be cited later than corporate publications if they address more complex 
scientific advances. 
Proposition 1: If corporate science cited by patent applications is more applied than science 
taken out in the public domain, it should be cited earlier. 
We focus on the time lags from the publication year of the scientific articles cited in our 
patents and the year in which they receive the first citation in a patent application. Table 4 
shows that company publications are cited, on average, six months later those taken out by 
scientific institutions. A t-test rejects the null-hypothesis that there is no difference between 
the average citation lags for corporate publications and publications taken out by the non-
profit sector at the 1% level of statistical significance. This suggests that – conditional on 
being cited in patents at all - public science is cited earlier than corporate science in the patent 
literature. If we applied the standard interpretation to the citation lag measure this would 
mean that corporate science cited in patents is more basic and complex than public science 
cited in patents since it takes longer until the corporate results are picked up in follow-up 
inventions. 
Table 4 about here 
Our third test for potential differences between publications from science and industry is 
based on citation categories. We submit that if corporate publications reflect scientific 
advances which are closer to industrial applications they should be more likely to threaten the 
novelty of patent applications. Scientific publications from the public sector, in contrast, 
should be more likely to be cited as non-infringing state of the art if they reflect more basic 
research. Hence, our second proposition reads: 
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Proposition 2: If corporate science cited by patent applications is more applied than science 
from the public sector, it should be more likely to be cited as blocking prior art while 
publications from the public sector should be rather cited as non-infringing state of the art. 
We conduct two different tests: first, we distinguish between patent citations to 
publications that are quoted as blocking (X- and Y-types) and other types of citations, and, 
second, we use a more disaggregated level of categories distinguishing between X-type, Y-
type and the residual group of citations. The latter refer to prior art that explicitly refer to the 
non-infringing state of art in a technology domain (Webb et al., 2005, Harhoff et al., 2005). If 
publications from the public sector were more basic, we would expect to find them primarily 
in this citation category. Pearson Χ2-tests show that the distribution of publications from the 
public sector across citation type categories is not significantly different from the citation type 
distribution of corporate publications (see Table 5). Hence, there is no evidence for corporate 
research being more challenging with regard to the novelty criteria for patent applications 
than public science. 
Table 5 about here 
The tests above focused on the potential differences between scientific publications taken 
out by the corporate and private sector within our sample of publications that are cited in 
patent applications. A final test compares these publications to a control group of publications 
that receive no citations by the patent literature. The aim of this comparison is twofold: first, 
we want to investigate whether publications cited in patents are more applied than the control 
group and, hence, less important in science (as visible from the citations these publications 
receive by other journal articles). Second, we are interested in potential differences between 
scientific publications taken out in the private and corporate sector regarding their importance 
in science. If corporate publications are more applied they should receive fewer citations in 
the scientific literature. Lastly, we investigate whether there is a difference between 
publications cited in patent applications with regard to their origin (public versus private 
sector). We submit three propositions: 
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Proposition 3a: If science cited in patent documents is more applied than science only 
contributing to the scientific realm, it should receive fewer citations from scientific articles. 
Proposition 3b: If science generated in the public sector is more basic than corporate 
science, it should be cited more often in scientific journals. 
Proposition 3c: If public science cited in patent documents is more basic than corporate 
science cited in patent documents, it should be cited more often in scientific journals. 
In order to conduct a test for our propositions we drew a random sample of 100 
publications cited by patents in our sample. Half of them are authored by scientists in the 
private sector, half of them by scientists working in the public sector. For these publications, 
we retrieved all scientific articles published in the same journal issue from the Web of 
Science database as a control group of scientific publications that are not cited in patents. We 
then manually classified the affiliation of the authors of the control publications. After having 
excluded scientific articles without affiliation details and those that are co-authored by 
scientists in public institutions and corporate laboratories, we are left with a sample of 4,892 
scientific articles, 3,702 from scientists working in the public sector and 1,190 from corporate 
scientists.  
We run count data models for the number of citations these articles receive by journal 
articles (up until May 2010) as a measure for their importance in science. Most important 
regressors in the model are a dummy that indicates whether the author is a scientist in a non-
profit organization (Public), a dummy whether the publication is cited in patents (Cited in 
patents) and an interaction term between these two variables. In addition, we include the 
number of pages per article as a proxy of the amount of findings reported in the document, 
publication year dummies21 and journal dummies as additional regressors.  
Table 6 shows the empirical findings. The estimation results show no significant difference in 
the number of citations by scientific journals with regard to the author affiliation (private 
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 The publication year dummies should account for the truncation of the dependent variable. Note that 
truncation is a minor problem in this application since the control group is taken from the same 
publication year as the publications cited in patents.  
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versus public sector). Hence, we do not find support for the hypothesis that corporate articles 
are less important in the scientific domain than articles taken out by the non-profit domain. 
An interesting result is, however, that publications that receive citations by patents are also 
more frequently cited in scientific journals. This signals that publications which are important 
in the scientific domain are also those that trigger future advances in a science-intense 
technology as semiconductor. There is no significant effect of the interaction term of being 
cited in patents and being authored by a scientist in the public sector.   
Table 6 about here 
To summarize our test results, we do not find any evidence that corporate publications are 
more applied than publications by the public sector conditional on being cited in the patent 
literature: corporate publications are published in the same journals, they are not cited later in 
the patent literature and they are not differently distributed across citations categories. This 
suggests that there is no difference in nature of the published technologies cited in patents that 
could explain the blocking power of corporate publications. Furthermore, there is no 
difference between publications from the corporate and public domain regarding their 
importance in science. These findings underline the possibility of a strategic explanation for 
our previous finding that corporate publications are more powerful in the patent system. For 
instance, if corporate articles were strategically published as complements to other pieces of 
prior art as the empirical results from the previous section proposed. 
6. Conclusion 
Defensive disclosure of technological knowledge by companies with the aim to preempt 
rivals’ patents has attracted the attention of academic scholars in the field of law, economics 
and management science (e.g. Merges, 2004, Parchomovsky, 2000, Johnson, 2004). The 
academic discussion about this topic has raised two main streams of thoughts. The first 
branch, mainly carried out by economists, sees open disclosure of technological advances as a 
catching up strategy for laggards in patent races. In these models the laggard publishes 
preliminary results that are not patentable in order to prolong the patent race (Parchomovsky, 
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2000, Baker and Mezzetti, 2005, Bar, 2006, Lichtmann et al., 2000, De Fraja, 1993). Scholars 
in law and management science, on the contrary, consider open disclosure as a 
complementary strategy to patenting (Colson, 2001, Buxbaum, 2001, Rinner, 2003, Johnson, 
2004, Henkel and Pangerls, 2008). The latter perspective finds partial confirmation in 
interviews with patent experts in the corporate sector, while the patent race model is largely 
rejected by practitioners (Henkel and Prangerl, 2008). Both streams of the literature assume 
that corporate publications enter the pool of prior art which is relevant to judge the novelty of 
patent applications at the patent office and that they have the power to block or hinder patent 
applications. This proposed mechanism behind corporate publications as a means to preempt 
patents on related technologies so far lacked empirical evidence.  
This study provides for the first time systematic (large-scale) evidence on the effectiveness 
of corporate publications for securing the freedom to operate a technology by blocking related 
patent application. We focus on the field of semiconductor technology as an example of a 
science-based, complex technology. Our empirical analysis reveals several interesting 
findings. First, we show and confirm that the technology field of semiconductor is heavily 
based on scientific knowledge. An average patent application in semiconductor cites .26 
scientific journal articles. Second, we show that science in semiconductor does not 
exclusively serve as a foundation for technology development, but that it also challenges the 
novelty of patent applications. In particular, company publications are effective in blocking 
related patent applications and, accordingly, have the power to serve as a device for securing 
the freedom to operate a technology. Hence, we show for the first time that presumed 
mechanisms behind the blocking power of corporate publications works. 
In a second step of the analysis, we use detailed information from the patent examination 
process at the EPO that allows us to show that corporate publications are, in particular, 
novelty threatening if combined with other pieces of prior art like patents,22 while they are not 
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 Although our data does not allow us to determine which documents are combined when threatening a 
patent application as a combination we can rely on the EPO patent examination guidelines. The 
guidelines give two examples for combinations of novelty threatening combinations of prior art. The 
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effective as standalone documents. This suggests that corporate publications in semiconductor 
are effective in securing the freedom to operate as complement to other pieces of prior art as 
suggested in the law and management literature (Colson, 2001; Henkel and Prangerl, 2008; 
Rinner, 2003). This finding is intuitive for a complex industry like semiconductor where firms 
pursue “portfolio maximizing” IP protection strategies in order to avoid being held up by 
other firms (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001, Ziedonis, 2004).  
We can reject that corporate scientific publications have a superior power to block patent 
applications because they deal with scientific advances that are more applied and closer to 
commercial ends than scientific publications produced in the public sector, and are, hence, 
potentially more relevant for the evaluation of the novelty of patent application. We can rule 
out this alternative explanation based on a number of tests. The results show that there is no 
significant difference in the nature and significance of publications by corporation and by 
non-profit organizations, both in the technology and in the scientific domain. 
A limitation of this study is that we cannot provide evidence for the motivation behind 
corporate scientific publications. In other words, we cannot establish that firms publish 
scientific advances to intentionally preempt (patent) competition. We acknowledge that there 
are several other reasons for companies to disclose their inventions (Penin, 2007). Companies 
can, for instance, disclose technical advances to allow upstream suppliers improving their 
products (Harhoff et al., 2003b). Disclosure of technologies can increase the size of 
downstream markets (Harhoff, 1996) or trigger feedback from users in downstream markets 
(Penin, 2007). Knowledge can also be disclosed with the intention to implement a technology 
as a standard (Spencer, 2003) or to achieve compatibility with interdependent products 
(Cusumano and Gawer, 2002). Scientific publications can further be used as a means to 
increase firm reputation (Hicks, 1995), to motivate researchers in the private sector 
(Henderson and Cockburn, 1994) and to attract the best employees (MacMillon and Hamilton, 
                                                                                                                                            
first example refers to the combination of a patent and a scientific non-patent document and the second 
example refers to a patent family. Hence, we can assume that if a corporate publication is blocking 
most likely a patent document is the reference that it is combined with. 
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2000). We want to stress that these alternative motivations for corporate scientific 
publications do not impact our findings that corporate science has superior power to block 
patent applications and that this effect stems from the combination of corporate science with 
other pieces of prior art. Our study just does not allow to conclude that firms intentionally 
publish corporate technologies to deter patents on related technological matters.  
As it is not possible to investigate the motivations behind corporate publications on a large 
scale our study has to be seen as a complement to case study evidence on this topic. 
Interviews with industry expert would be needed to uncover how publishing and patenting is 
strategically used at the firm level. Information on the firms’ technology portfolio and on the 
different IP protection tools that are used at the level of the individual innovation project (and 
their combinations) would be necessary which renders this research question impossible for 
large-scale empirical analyses.23  
Furthermore, we only focus on scientific articles as a channel for corporate strategic 
disclosure. We are aware of the fact that there are alternative platforms for corporate 
disclosure as, for instance, specialized publication platforms like “Research Disclosure” and 
“IP.com”. Henkel’s and Pangerl’s (2008) interviews with IP experts in industry, however, 
                                                 
23
 An approach applied in prior studies to assign patents and publications to innovation projects is to 
define patent-publications pairs within a firms’ patent and publication portfolio (Ducor, 2000, Murray 
and Stern, 2007, Lissoni and Montobbio, 2008). Such an approach relies either on the knowledge of a 
person skilled in the art who is able to define patent-publication pairs by studying their content (Ducor, 
2000, Murray, 2002, Murray and Stern, 2007), which renders this method impossible for large samples, 
or it is based on co-word analyses of patent documents and scientific publications (Lissoni and 
Montobbio, 2008). In our eyes, it is not evident that the latter approach would yield valid matches in a 
complex, cumulative technology like semiconductor where one invention is based on many different 
building blocks that are likely to be relevant for more than one innovation projects. The fact that 
semiconductor has many big players holding huge patent and publication portfolios would make the 
definition of individual innovation projects even less credible.  
Similarly, cross-citations between patents and publications are not a perfect means for defining patent-
publication pairs. The majority of references to prior art in EPO patent applications are added by the 
patent examiner. This means that publications cited in patents do not necessarily indicate that the cited 
publications refer to the same innovation project as the patent application. Further, the patent 
examination guidelines dictate that only the most important and earliest sources are to be cited. Hence, 
we would miss many citations to publications from the same project. Patent citations in publications 
might be a more promising venue for identifying patents and publications belonging to the same 
project. Again, there is no guarantee that all patents belonging to the same project are cited in 
publications. Further, patents belonging to different projects can be cites in publications. Hence, the 
question remains how reliable such an approach would be for a complex, cumulative technology with 
many agents with huge publication and patent portfolios. 
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underline the importance of scientific publications for defensive publishing. They conclude 
that companies rate scientific publications as the second most effective mechanism to disclose 
strategically (after internet providers specialized in public disclosure). In the context of a 
science-based industry like semiconductor, scientific publications might be even more 
important for strategic disclosure by companies. 
Another limitation is that our results for the semiconductor technology cannot be 
considered as representative for other technology fields. Semiconductor is one of the most 
science-based technologies. Most likely, corporate publications are less effective for blocking 
patent applications in other technological areas. Semiconductor is, furthermore, a complex 
technology where firms engage in patent portfolio races rather than in traditional patent races 
(Hall and Ziedonis, 2004). It cannot be taken for granted that our result that publications 
block patent applications in combination with other pieces of prior art applies to other 
technology sectors as well. In particular, for discrete industries, where the patent race models 
are a more attractive theoretical framework to study corporate publications, more research 
should be needed. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 all patent applications Granted rejected t-test  
 mean std. dev. mean std. dev. Mean std. dev. mean diff.  
REF 4.44 2.98 4.51 2.92 4.34 3.05 0.17 ** 
Log(REF) 1.60 0.60 1.63 0.54 1.56 0.66 0.07 *** 
XY REF 1.39 1.91 1.22 1.78 1.61 2.04 -0.40 *** 
XY REF/REF 0.24 0.30 0.22 0.28 0.27 0.32 -0.05 *** 
NPL 0.46 1.46 0.43 1.47 0.51 1.45 -0.08 ** 
JOUR 0.26 0.86 0.23 0.82 0.28 0.83 -0.05 ** 
XY JOUR REF / XY REF 0.05 0.19 0.04 0.18 0.06 0.21 -0.02 *** 
    X JOUR REF / XY REF 0.03 0.14 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.15 -0.01 *** 
    Y JOUR REF / XY REF 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.12 0.03 0.14 -0.01 *** 
XY comp JOUR REF/XY JOUR REF 0.04 0.17 0.03 0.15 0.05 0.20 -0.02 *** 
    X comp JOUR REF/XY JOUR REF 0.04 0.25 0.03 0.21 0.05 0.28 -0.02 *** 
    Y comp JOUR REF/XY JOUR REF 0.02 0.16 0.01 0.13 0.03 0.20 -0.02 *** 
IPCs 2.53 1.56 2.57 1.56 2.48 1.57 0.09 ** 
TIME 4.98 2.33 5.26 2.20 4.59 2.43 0.67 *** 
INV 2.72 1.77 2.78 1.82 2.65 1.68 0.13  *** 
PUBLIC 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.11 0.01  
NPLs before 1988 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.17 -0.00  
Unidentified NPLs 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.26 -0.01 ** 
# obs 6,226  3,559  2,667    
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Table 2: Heteroscedastic Probit model for the patent grant decision (6,226 obs) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
coeff  
(s.e.) 
coeff  
(s.e.) 
coeff 
(s.e.) 
coeff  
(s.e.) 
coeff  
(s.e.) 
Log(REF) 0.37** 0.42** 0.50** 0.52** 0.52** 
(0.18) (0.19) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
XY REF/REF -1.16*** -1.29*** -1.29*** -1.28*** 
(0.32) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) 
XY JOUR REF/ -1.41*** -0.91 
REF (0.52) (0.56) 
X JOUR REF/ -0.94 
REF (0.65) 
Y JOUR REF/ -0.77 
REF (0.75) 
XY comp JOUR -0.97** 
REF/ REF (0.48) 
X comp JOUR -0.61 
REF/ REF (0.56) 
Y comp JOUR -1.49** 
REF/ REF (0.62) 
X REF/REF 
Y REF/REF 
Log(IPCs) 0.46*** 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 
(0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
Log(TIME) 1.92*** 1.75*** 1.80*** 1.85*** 1.84*** 
(0.51) (0.45) (0.47) (0.49) (0.50) 
Log(INV) 0.30* 0.26* 0.27* 0.28* 0.28* 
(0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Public -0.02 -0.10 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 
(0.48) (0.46) (0.47) (0.49) (0.48) 
constant -3.02*** -2.65*** -2.71*** -2.87*** -2.85*** 
(0.99) (0.89) (0.92) (0.98) (0.99) 
LR-tests: 
Appl. Years 78.65*** 78.64*** 70.07*** 74.58*** 75.04*** 
Priority dummies 248.22*** 243.59*** 244.44*** 252.54*** 252.46*** 
Tech. classes 34.33*** 36.14*** 36.80*** 35.35*** 34.97*** 
Wald test for heteroscedasticity 90.83*** 84.58*** 82.48*** 85.38*** 85.36*** 
LogLikelihood -3,889.26 -3,865.17 -3,851.24 -3,847.42 -3,846.40 
***,**,* indicate statistical significance at the 1%-, 5%-, 10%-level. 
Standard error are clustered for the individual applicants.  
Estimated coefficients for a dummy for the share of NPLs that could not be identified (model 3, 4 and 5) and a 
dummy for NPLs issued before 1988 (model 4 and 5).   
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Table 3: List of top 25 Journals  
JOURNALS 
 
TOTAL SAMPLE 
 
CORPORATE 
 
NON-PROFIT 
 
Articles Share Rank Articles Share Rank Articles Share Rank 
APPLIED PHYSICS LETTERS 354 0.166 1 113 0.155 1 200 0.17 1 
JAPANESE JOURNAL OF APPLIED PHYSICS 150 0.071 2 79 0.108 2 64 0.054 4 
JOURNAL OF APPLIED PHYSICS 132 0.062 3 35 0.048 5 72 0.061 2 
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON ELECTRON DEVICES 103 0.048 4 60 0.082 3 33 0.028 8 
THIN SOLID FILMS 95 0.045 5 21 0.029 11 65 0.055 3 
IEEE ELECTRON DEVICE LETTERS 80 0.038 6 32 0.044 6 33 0.028 8 
JOURNAL OF THE ELECTROCHEMICAL SOCIETY 75 0.035 7 38 0.052 4 30 0.025 11 
JOURNAL OF VACUUM SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY A-VACUUM SURFACES AND 
FILMS 74 0.035 8 28 0.038 7 35 0.03 7 
JOURNAL OF CRYSTAL GROWTH 73 0.034 9 22 0.030 10 42 0.036 5 
ELECTRONICS LETTERS 68 0.032 10 23 0.032 9 38 0.032 6 
MATERIALS SCIENCE & ENGINEERING  40 0.019 11 5 0.007 23 33 0.028 8 
IEEE PHOTONICS TECHNOLOGY LETTERS 37 0.017 12 15 0.021 12 19 0.016 15 
SOLID STATE TECHNOLOGY 34 0.016 13 26 0.036 8 5 0.004 33 
MICROELECTRONIC ENGINEERING 34 0.016 13 15 0.021 12 17 0.014 16 
SOLAR ENERGY MATERIALS AND SOLAR CELLS 28 0.013 15 7 0.001 17 21 0.018 12 
SOLID-STATE ELECTRONICS 26 0.012 16 5 0.007 23 20 0.017 14 
SENSORS AND ACTUATORS A-PHYSICAL 24 0.011 17 5 0.007 23 17 0.014 16 
SEMICONDUCTOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 23 0.011 18 7 0.001 17 14 0.012 19 
PHYSICA C 23 0.011 18 2 0.003 38 21 0.018 12 
NATURE 22 0.010 20 6 0.008 19 11 0.009 22 
SCIENCE 21 0.001 21 5 0.007 23 13 0.011 20 
ADVANCED MATERIALS 18 0.009 22 2 0.003 38 16 0.014 18 
IEICE TRANSACTIONS ON ELECTRONICS 17 0.008 23 15 0.021 12 2 0.002 66 
IEEE JOURNAL OF SOLID-STATE CIRCUITS 17 0.008 23 10 0.014 16 6 0.005 31 
NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTS & METHODS IN PHYSICS RESEARCH SECTION  17 0.008 23 6 0.008 19 11 0.0093 22 
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Table 4: Tests for different average citation lags (in years) 
Results of the t-Test with unequal sample size and unequal variance 
 Observations Mean Std. Err. t-Test 
Public 1413 4.120 0.067  
Companies 962 4.674 0.09  
Mean difference   -0.553 0.110         t =  -5.013 
We consider only articles which are exclusively authored by either corporate scientists or from public institutes. 
No co-authored articles are included. All citations to patents are included.   
 
 
Table 5: Tests for different distributions of reference categories 
Level of Aggregation Categories Companies Public Total 
Aggregated Others 463 683 1146 
 X or Y 499 730 1229 
 Total 962 1413 2375 
 Pearson-Χ2 (1) = 0.0099                                                               Pr = 0.921 
Disaggregated Others 464 683 1147 
 Xs 324 515 839 
 Ys 174 215 389 
 Total 962 1413 2375 
  Pearson-Χ2(2) = 4.1233                                                                Pr = 0.127 
We consider only articles which are exclusively authored by either corporate scientists or from public institutes. 
No co-authored articles are included. All citations to patents are included.   
 
 
Table 6: Citations of public and corporate publications in science 
 Poisson with 
robust standard errors 
Negative Binomial 
 
coeff. 
(s.e.) 
coeff. 
(s.e.) 
coeff. 
(s.e.) 
coeff. 
(s.e.) 
Public -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 
(-0.07) (-0.07) (-0.04) (-0.04) 
Cited in patents 0.64 *** 0.86 ** 0.51 *** 0.32 * 
(-0.18) (-0.33) (-0.13) (-0.18) 
Public * cited in patents  
 
-0.15 
 
0.4 
(-0.36) (-0.27) 
Page number 0.11 *** 0.11 *** 0.16 *** 0.16 *** 
(-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.01) 
LR-tests:         
Pub years 17.51.95*** 1753.98 *** 36.13 *** 35.35 *** 
Journals 28779.46 *** 28795.37*** 1071.60*** 1073.56*** 
Loglikelihood -75,723.5 -75,715.5 -18,138.1 -18,137.1 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%-level. 
Standard errors are clustered for issues.  
All regressions include 12 publication year dummies and 32 journal dummies. 
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Table 7: Distribution of our sample of patent applications across different technology classes within semiconductor 
6-digit 
IPC class 
Description # patent 
assignments 
subfield 
dummies 
H01L21 Processes or apparatus specially adapted for the manufacture or treatment of semiconductor or solid state devices    4.412 t1 
H01L23 Details of semiconductor or other solid state devices 1.729 t2 
H01L25 Assemblies consisting of a plurality of individual semiconductor or other solid state devices 263 t3 
H01L27 Devices consisting of a plurality of semiconductor or other solid-state components formed in or on a common substrate 1.422 t4 
H01L29 Semiconductor devices specially adapted for rectifying. amplifying. oscillating or switching and having at least one potential-jump 
barrier or surface barrier; capacitors or resistors with at least one potential-jump barrier or surface barrier 
1.129 t5 
H01L31 Semiconductor devices sensitive to infra-red radiation. light. electromagnetic radiation of shorter wavelength. or corpuscular 
radiation and specially adapted either for the conversion of the energy of such radiation into electrical energy or for the control of 
electrical energy by such radiation; processes or apparatus specially adapted for the manufacture or treatment thereof 
666 



 

!
t6 
H01L33 Semiconductor devices with at least one potential-jump barrier or surface barrier specially adapted for light emission; processes or 
apparatus specially adapted for the manufacture or treatment thereof or of parts thereof 
373 
H01L35 Thermoelectric devices comprising a junction of dissimilar materials; processes or apparatus specially adapted for the manufacture 
or treatment thereof or of parts thereof 
72 
H01L37 Thermoelectric devices without a junction of dissimilar materials; thermomagnetic devices; processes or apparatus specially 
adapted for the manufacture or treatment thereof or of parts thereof 
17 
H01L39 Devices using superconductivity or hyperconductivity; processes or apparatus specially adapted for the manufacture or treatment 
thereof or of parts thereof 
176 
H01L41 Piezo-electric elements in general; electrostrictive elements in general; magnetostrictive elements in general; processes or apparatus 
specially adapted for the manufacture or treatment thereof or of parts thereof 
406 



 

!
t7 
H01L43 Devices using galvano-magnetic or similar magnetic effects; processes or apparatus specially adapted for the manufacture or 
treatment thereof  
55 
H01L45 Solid state devices specially adapted for rectifying amplifying oscillating or switching without a potential-jump barrier or surface 
barrier; Ovshinsky-effect devices; processes or apparatus specially adapted for the manufacture or treatment thereof  
19 
H01L47 Bulk negative resistance effect devices; processes or apparatus specially adapted for the manufacture or treatment thereof  4 
H01L49 Solid state devices not provided for in groups  H01L 27/00-H01L 47/00 and H01L 51/00 and not provided for in any other 
subclass; Processes or apparatus specially adapted for the manufacture or treatment thereof or of parts thereof   
8 
H01L51 Solid state devices using organic materials as the active part. or using a combination of organic materials with other materials as the 
active part; Processes or apparatus specially adapted for the manufacture or treatment of such devices 
174 t8 
Total  10.925  
The total number of patent assignments corresponds to our final sample of 6.380 patent applications. Patent can be assigned to more than one technology class within semiconductor. 
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Table 8: Bivariate Correlations 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 
1. Granted 1.00 
2. Log(REF) 0.06 1.00 
3. XY REF/REF -0.10 0.16 1.00 
4. XY JOUR REF/XY REF -0.05 0.11 -0.11 1.00 
5. X JOUR REF/XY REF -0.04 0.07 -0.07 0.76 1.00 
6. Y JOUR REF/XY REF -0.03 0.08 -0.10 0.69 0.06 1.00 
7. XY comp JOUR REF/XY JOUR REF -0.06 0.12 -0.01 0.63 0.50 0.42 1.00 
8. X comp JOUR REF XY JOUR REF -0.04 0.10 0.00 0.49 0.61 0.08 0.77 1.00 
9. Y comp JOUR REF/ XY JOUR REF -0.05 0.09 -0.04 0.46 0.07 0.63 0.62 0.15 1.00 
10. Log(IPCs) 0.04 0.20 -0.01 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.02 1.00 
11. Log(TIME) 0.17 0.01 -0.03 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 1.00 
12. Log(INV) 0.04 0.04 -0.01 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.04 1.00 
13. PUBLIC 0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.06 
The bivariate correlations for the main regressors are very low. High values appear only for variables that are correlated by definition, like XY JOUR REF/ XY REF and X 
JOUR REF/ XY REF or Y JOUR REF/ XY REF, where the former variables is the sum of the latter two. Note that these variables are not used in the same regression model.
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Table 9: Heteroscedastic Probit model for the patent grant decision for the subsample 
of firms with less than 200 patent applications (5,095 obs) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
coeff  
(s.e.) 
coeff  
(s.e.) 
coeff  
(s.e.) 
coeff 
 (s.e.) 
coeff  
(s.e.) 
Log(REF) 0.28 0.31 0.37* 0.37* 0.37* 
(0.20) (0.20) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
XY REF/REF -0.85*** -0.94*** -0.94*** -0.93*** 
(0.27) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) 
XY JOUR REF/ -1.05** -0.48 
REF (0.48) (0.50) 
X JOUR REF/ -0.74 
REF (0.53) 
Y JOUR REF/ -1.65** 
REF (0.76) 
XY comp JOUR -1.18** 
REF/ REF (0.55) 
X comp JOUR -0.75 
REF/ REF (0.63) 
Y comp JOUR -0.18 
REF/ REF (0.63) 
Log(IPCs) 0.43*** 0.37*** 0.38*** 0.39*** 0.39*** 
(0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) 
Log(TIME) 2.01*** 1.87*** 1.93*** 1.99*** 1.95*** 
(0.51) (0.47) (0.48) (0.50) (0.49) 
Log(INV) 0.24* 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22 
(0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Public -0.07 -0.11 -0.08 -0.11 -0.11 
(0.47) (0.46) (0.47) (0.50) (0.49) 
Constant -2.74*** -2.46*** -2.52*** -2.70*** -2.63*** 
(0.97) (0.90) (0.91) (0.97) (0.95) 
LR-tests: 
Appl. Years 37.54*** 39.62*** 34.22*** 33.54*** 24.92*** 
Priority dummies 120.50*** 116.75*** 117.99*** 116.68*** 107.15*** 
Tech. classes 28.62*** 29.59*** 28.67*** 28.32*** 19.38*** 
Wald test for 
heteroscedasticity 78.57*** 72.89*** 71.12*** 71.65*** 71.16*** 
LogLikelihood -3,188.83 -3,176.99 -3,169.98 -3,165.88 -3,165.22 
***,**,* indicate statistical significance at the 1%-, 5%-, 10%-level. 
Standard error are clustered for the individual applicants. 
Estimated coefficients for a dummy for the share of NPLs that could not be identified (model 3, 4 and 5) and a 
dummy for NPLs issued before 1988 (model 4 and 5).  
All regressions include five application year dummies, eight technology class dummies and  four priority 
dummies. 
 
